----------------------- Page 1-----------------------

 SUPREME COURT

 OF THE UNITED STATES

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

UNITED STATES, )

 Petitioner, )

v. ) No. 19-1434

ARTHREX, INC., ET AL., )

 Respondents. )

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL., )

 Petitioners, )

v. ) No. 19-1452

ARTHREX, INC., ET AL., )

 Respondents. )

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ARTHREX, INC., )

 Petitioner, )

v. ) No. 19-1458

SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL., )

 Respondents. )

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Pages: 1 through 94

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: March 1, 2021

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

 Official Reporters

 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 206

 Washington, D.C. 20005

 (202) 628-4888

 www.hrccourtreporters.com

----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 1

 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 3 UNITED STATES, )

 4 Petitioner, )

 5 v. ) No. 19-1434

 6 ARTHREX, INC., ET AL., )

 7 Respondents. )

 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 9 SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL., )

10 Petitioners, )

11 v. ) No. 19-1452

12 ARTHREX, INC., ET AL., )

13 Respondents. )

14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

15 ARTHREX, INC., )

16 Petitioner, )

17 v. ) No. 19-1458

18 SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL., )

19 Respondents. )

20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

21 Washington, D.C.

22 Monday, March 1, 2021

23 The above-entitled matter came on for

24 oral argument before the Supreme Court of the

25 United States at 10:00 a.m.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 2

 1 APPEARANCES:

 2

 3 MALCOLM L. STEWART, Deputy Solicitor General,

 4 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;

 5 on behalf of the United States.

 6 MARK A. PERRY, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.;

 7 on behalf of Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al.

 8 JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.;

 9 on behalf of Arthrex, Inc.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 3

 1 C O N T E N T S

 2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF: **PAGE:**

 3 MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ.

 4 On behalf of the United States 4

 5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

 6 MARK A. PERRY, ESQ.

 7 On behalf of Smith & Nephew, Inc.,

 8 et al. 28

 9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

10 JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, ESQ.

11 On behalf of Arthrex, Inc. 47

12 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF:

13 MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ.

14 On behalf of the United States 91

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 4

 1 P R O C E E D I N G S

 2 (10:00 a.m.)

 3 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** We will hear

 4 argument this morning in Case 19-1434, United

 5 States versus Arthrex, Incorporated, and the

 6 consolidated cases.

 7 Mr. Stewart.

 8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

 9 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES

10 **MR. STEWART:** Mr. Chief Justice, and

11 may it please the Court:

12 In Edmond versus United States, this

13 Court held that Coast Guard Court of Criminal

14 Appeals judges were inferior officers. The

15 Court based that conclusion on the combined

16 supervisory powers of the Coast Guard Judge

17 Advocate General and the Court of Appeals for

18 the Armed Forces.

19 Here, the mechanisms by which the

20 PTO's director can supervise administrative

21 patent judges substantially exceed the combined

22 powers of the supervising officials in Edmond.

23 The Judge Advocate General was authorized to

24 promulgate rules of procedure for the Court of

25 Criminal Appeals, and he could remove

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 5

 1 individuals from their judicial assignments

 2 without cause.

 3 The PTO director can exercise those

 4 same two powers, but he has other important

 5 tools of control as well. The director can

 6 promulgate binding guidance concerning

 7 substantive patent law. He can designate

 8 particular board opinions as precedential, thus

 9 making those opinions binding on future panels.

10 He can also decide whether any particular review

11 will be instituted and which judges will sit on

12 the panel. And he can de-institute a review

13 even after it has been commenced.

14 Arthrex focuses primarily on the

15 purported absence of any mechanism by which the

16 director can review a panel's final written

17 decision. But the board can grant rehearing of

18 any such decision, and the director is a member

19 of the board and is authorized to decide which

20 members will sit on any panel.

21 The director, thus, can convene a new

22 panel that consists of himself and two other

23 members of his choosing to decide whether any

24 final written decision will be reheard.

25 The director's power over rehearings

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 6

 1 is not plenary since he must exercise it jointly

 2 with two other board members. But, in Edmond,

 3 the review authority of the Court of Appeals for

 4 the Armed Forces was not plenary either since

 5 that court could not reassess the factual

 6 findings of the court of appeals -- from the

 7 Court of Criminal Appeals.

 8 Taken together, the director's

 9 supervisory powers are fully sufficient to

10 render administrative patent judges inferior

11 officers.

12 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Mr. Stewart,

13 that was a long list of things that the director

14 can do, but, of course, the one thing that he

15 can't do is just change the decision of the APJ.

16 And the rest of those things -- deciding whether

17 to rehear, you know, stacking, in a

18 non-pejorative way, the panels, rehearing, you

19 know, guidance on hypothetical facts -- they all

20 seem to be more or less ways of twisting the

21 arms of the APJs. And so it is sort of direct

22 -- directly opposite to what the Appointments

23 Clause was designed to do, which is transparency

24 and make it clear who's responsible.

25 Here, you know, the director can

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 7

 1 pressure the APJ, but, at the end of the day, he

 2 can say: Well, that's not my fault. That's

 3 what he wanted.

 4 Why isn't that true?

 5 **MR. STEWART:** I think -- I'd say two

 6 things in response to that. The first are the

 7 supervisory mechanisms that we've identified are

 8 transparent. If the director issues binding

 9 guidance that says here's how the patent laws

10 apply to particular fact patterns, that will be

11 done in the director's own name and the director

12 will have responsibility for it. But the --

13 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Yeah, but the

14 -- the APJ is the one who's going to decide

15 whether that so-called hypothetical applies in

16 this particular case, and if he comes out with a

17 different result, that's the executive decision,

18 not the director's rule about hypotheticals.

19 **MR. STEWART:** Well, even if you focus

20 on the mechanisms that are available after a

21 final written decision is issued, the -- the

22 board panel's decision will be the decision of

23 the executive agency only if it is not reheard.

24 And as I said in my opening, the

25 director's power over rehearings is not plenary,

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 8

 1 but it is substantial. And --

 2 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you,

 3 counsel.

 4 Justice Thomas.

 5 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Thank you, Mr. Chief

 6 Justice.

 7 Mr. Stewart, you said it's not

 8 plenary, but it's substantial. How would -- how

 9 would we define -- discern what is substantial?

10 **MR. STEWART:** Well, I think what the

11 Court said in Edmond was that the mark of an

12 inferior officer is that the inferior has a

13 superior and is supervised at some level by

14 Executive Branch officials who are appointed by

15 the President and confirmed by the Senate.

16 And we don't have a bright-line test

17 for this. But the Court in Edmond said the fact

18 that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

19 can't second-guess the factual determinations of

20 the lower court is not sufficient to make those

21 lower court judges principal officers.

22 Things can slip through the cracks and

23 supervision can, nevertheless, be sufficient.

24 And that's essentially what we have here. Even

25 if you just look at after-the-fact review, the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 9

 1 director has substantial control.

 2 But I think the Court should focus

 3 primarily on the mechanisms of control that are

 4 available in the first instance, issuing binding

 5 guidance and so forth, because the usual

 6 hallmark of supervisory authority is that the

 7 supervisor can tell the subordinate how to do

 8 the job before the subordinate does it. And the

 9 director has ample tools there.

10 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Thank you.

11 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

12 Breyer.

13 **JUSTICE BREYER:** I'm just curious, you

14 may not have thought about this, but maybe the

15 SG's office has, but, in PCAOB, if we go back to

16 that, I dissented and had a very long appendix

17 with dozens and dozens of people that I suddenly

18 thought were -- they -- they seemed to be like

19 here -- we used to call them hearing examiners,

20 and, really, they used to be civil servants.

21 All kinds of shapes and sizes in terms

22 of powers, and they suddenly all became officers

23 of the United States. But the majority said,

24 we're not saying they all are. We're just

25 talking about PCAOB.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 10

 1 So are these people officers of the

 2 United States? Why, is my answer. I'd like a

 3 line, if you've ever thought of one, between the

 4 statement in PCAOB in the majority, don't worry,

 5 they're not all officers of the United States.

 6 Have you thought of a -- of a

 7 distinction there between the long list in PCAOB

 8 and would it apply here?

 9 **MR. STEWART:** I mean, we -- we've

10 essentially acquiesced in the proposition that

11 the board -- that administrative patent judges

12 are officers rather than employees, as you'll

13 recall from --

14 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Yeah.

15 **MR. STEWART:** -- the brief in this

16 case. There was a --

17 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Yeah, yeah.

18 **MR. STEWART:** -- period -- there was a

19 period when they were appointed by the director

20 and were thought to be employees. Congress --

21 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Yeah.

22 **MR. STEWART:** -- changed the statute.

23 It -- it's not absolutely clear that that's so,

24 but the mechanism of appointment is sufficient

25 so long as they are inferior officers.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 11

 1 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Yeah, that -- I

 2 thought you might have done that. And I wonder

 3 if, in the course of doing that, you thought of

 4 a line of some kind that might distinguish the

 5 dozens of people I put in that appendix from

 6 these people here and the majority in PCAOB.

 7 **MR. STEWART:** Well, I think that

 8 the -- the Court has drawn the line in terms --

 9 between "officer" and "employee" in terms of

10 exercising substantial authority under the laws

11 of the United States. Obviously, that's

12 something very far from a bright line.

13 I think it is significant in this

14 regard that the removal provision that's

15 applicable to administrative patent judges is

16 the same removal provision that applies to

17 officers and employees of the -- the PTO

18 generally. The removal provision signals that

19 Congress didn't intend for these officers to

20 exercise any unusual level of independence from

21 the director.

22 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice Alito.

23 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Thank you.

24 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Mr. Stewart, suppose

25 Congress enacted a statute providing that a

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 12

 1 deputy solicitor general shall have the final

 2 and unreviewable authority to decide whether the

 3 United States will take an appeal in any case

 4 involving the interpretation or application of

 5 one particular provision of one particular

 6 regulatory statute.

 7 Suppose the SG can decide which deputy

 8 is to review each case that falls into this

 9 category, the SG or the attorney general can

10 issue guidelines on the meaning of the provision

11 and the standard to be applied in deciding to

12 take an appeal, but, once a deputy -- a deputy

13 makes a decision, let's say it's a decision not

14 to appeal, nobody, not the attorney general or

15 the President himself, can countermand that.

16 Would that be constitutional?

17 **MR. STEWART:** I mean, I -- I think it

18 would be a close call. You would obviously be

19 looking at Morrison versus -- Morrison versus

20 Olson in order to determine -- to assess the

21 significance of the fact that the deputy's

22 authority was limited to a narrow category of

23 cases, and, certainly, the fact that the

24 solicitor general could promulgate substantive

25 standards that would bind the deputy in making

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 13

 1 his decision might lead you to conclude that

 2 that person is still an inferior officer rather

 3 than a principal officer.

 4 But however that case would come out,

 5 here, the decision of an ordinary PTAB panel is

 6 not final and unreviewable within the agency.

 7 It is subject to rehearing. The director is a

 8 member of the board. The director can appoint a

 9 panel that includes other board members in order

10 to determine whether rehearing shall be granted.

11 So that -- that authority, as I've

12 said, is not plenary but --

13 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Well, what if I change

14 my hypothetical so that the -- all of the

15 deputies collectively could review the decision

16 of the -- this one deputy? Would that -- would

17 that change it?

18 **MR. STEWART:** Well, if the solicitor

19 -- I -- I think that would change it somewhat.

20 I think it would change it more if you said the

21 solicitor general can sit on a panel that will

22 review the deputy's decision, and the solicitor

23 general may sit on a panel with two other

24 deputies and -- and theoretically could be

25 outvoted, but the solicitor general will not

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 14

 1 only issue guidance before the fact but can sit

 2 on the -- the board that determines whether the

 3 deputy's decision will be overridden. That --

 4 that would --

 5 **JUSTICE ALITO:** All right. Thank you,

 6 Mr. Stewart. Thanks.

 7 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

 8 Sotomayor.

 9 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** Mr. Stewart, the

10 other side's case comes down basically, I think,

11 to just saying you're not an inferior officer if

12 you can make final decisions that are

13 unreviewable by the director. That's a fairly

14 straightforward line.

15 Yours is a bit more amorphous. I

16 think it's what the Chief was getting to. But I

17 think that what I want to understand is, what is

18 your final test being judged against? Is it --

19 I mean, I thought I heard a little bit of the --

20 of it when you said the director is setting the

21 policies and procedures. He is -- he or she is

22 the person who controls the outcome in the sense

23 of setting what the policies and procedures are.

24 Am I right that that's your baseline?

25 **MR. STEWART:** That -- that's certainly

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 15

 1 part of it. And I would agree that we don't

 2 have a bright-line test, but that's in part

 3 because this Court has emphasized that there is

 4 no exclusive criterion for determining inferior

 5 versus principal officer status.

 6 And what we are emphasizing is that

 7 the director has really two different forms of

 8 control. He can issue policy guidance that will

 9 be binding on board panels in cases generally,

10 but the director also is a member of the board,

11 can participate in the board's decision-making

12 process in individual cases.

13 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** For my colleagues

14 -- and there are some who don't like amorphous

15 concepts or ones that don't have a -- a

16 yardstick by which to measure -- what is the

17 advantage of us keeping the Edmond's test?

18 **MR. STEWART:** I -- I think the

19 advantage is that the government is so

20 multifarious, there's such an enormous number of

21 officers and employees within the Executive

22 Branch that any attempt to -- to formulate a

23 bright-line test would almost inevitably lead to

24 anomalous results in some category -- categories

25 of cases.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 16

 1 Even in 1787, the framers were

 2 concerned that it would be administratively

 3 inconvenient to require Senate confirmation for

 4 all officers. And since that time, the

 5 Executive Branch has grown enormously, but

 6 there's still just one President and there's

 7 still just one Senate. And the Court --

 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you,

 9 counsel.

10 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice Kagan.

11 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Mr. Stewart, you put a

12 lot of weight on the ability of the director to

13 be part of a board that rehears a decision.

14 I -- I had thought that there was a -- a usual

15 mechanism for rehearing a decision that

16 didn't -- you know, that there's a sort of

17 permanent rehearing board, which the director

18 does not pick the other two members of.

19 **MR. STEWART:** Well, I think,

20 typically, the rehearing petition filed by one

21 of the parties would be addressed to the panel,

22 and the panel could decide whether to rehear the

23 case if it had -- if it believed that it had

24 overlooked something.

25 But, because the director is a member

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 17

 1 of the board and chooses the composition of the

 2 panel, the board -- the director can always

 3 decide in an individual case, no, here, the

 4 rehearing panel will be different.

 5 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** I'm -- I'm -- I'm

 6 sorry, you have to give me a little bit more

 7 about how this exactly works. That there's a

 8 decision of -- of a panel that the director

 9 doesn't like, and what does the director do?

10 **MR. STEWART:** The director could sua

11 sponte convene a new panel, and what's called --

12 known as the Precedential Opinions Panel, or the

13 POP, is the acronym, is presumptively composed

14 of the director, the commissioner for patents,

15 and the chief administrative patent judge. And

16 that panel can sit to issue a binding decision,

17 presuming -- assuming that two members of the

18 panel vote to do so. That -- that's what --

19 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Right. I think I was

20 talking about that, that -- that presumptive

21 panel with those particular three members. I

22 mean, the director doesn't merely have full

23 authority over the other two, doesn't -- does

24 he? He doesn't -- the other two might disagree

25 with him.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 18

 1 **MR. STEWART:** It -- it's -- it's true,

 2 and in that sense, the director's authority is

 3 not plenary. But, in Edmond as well, if the

 4 Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces disagreed

 5 with the factual findings of the Coast Guard

 6 Court of Criminal Appeals, there was really

 7 nothing that the CAAF could do about it.

 8 Factual determinations could slip through the

 9 cracks.

10 And, here, the director can not only

11 convene this panel; the director can issue

12 policy guidance that explain the -- the rules of

13 law as the director understands them, and other

14 panel members are obliged to -- to go along.

15 The only thing that really can slip

16 through the cracks in the PTO setting is factual

17 determinations with which the director might

18 disagree but other board members might invoke --

19 might -- might --

20 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Thank you,

21 Mr. Stewart.

22 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

23 Gorsuch.

24 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Good morning,

25 Mr. Stewart. Last term, the Court, in Seila

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 19

 1 Law, said that executive officials must always

 2 remain subject to the ongoing supervision and

 3 control of the elected President. Through the

 4 President's oversight, the chain of dependence

 5 is preserved so that low -- the lowest officers,

 6 the middle grade, and the highest all depend, as

 7 they ought, on the President and the President

 8 on the community.

 9 I -- I'm struggling to understand how

10 that interpretation of our Constitution squares

11 with your argument that not even the President

12 of the United States, either himself or through

13 his subordinates, can reverse a decision of

14 APJs. Where -- where is the chain of

15 dependence?

16 **MR. STEWART:** Well, the -- the

17 President obviously appoints the director

18 subject to Senate confirmation, and the director

19 can be removed by the President. The director

20 can --

21 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** I understand the

22 removal, but I -- my question was focused on the

23 supervision and control language in Seila Law.

24 **MR. STEWART:** Well, the -- the -- the

25 President can issue kind of instructions to the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 20

 1 director and can terminate the director if the

 2 -- the director doesn't comply. The director

 3 has various supervisory mechanisms.

 4 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Again, that's

 5 removal, and my question was focused on

 6 supervision. If the President disagrees with

 7 the decision or one of his designees down the

 8 chain of dependence disagrees with the decision,

 9 there's no remedy that the President has,

10 correct?

11 **MR. STEWART:** Well, there -- there is

12 a prospective remedy in the sense that the --

13 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** I'm talking about

14 the decision. I'm not talking about removal.

15 **MR. STEWART:** No, there is a -- there

16 is a right of appeals to the -- the Federal

17 Circuit. But I think --

18 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** That's --

19 **MR. STEWART:** -- the same thing --

20 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** -- that's a separate

21 branch of government. I'm -- again, I'm talking

22 within the Executive Branch, Mr. Stewart.

23 There's -- there's no chain of dependence

24 running to the President with respect to the

25 supervision of a particular decision, is there?

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 21

 1 **MR. STEWART:** There -- there is no

 2 ability to ensure that the factual findings of

 3 two other members of the panels -- panel could

 4 be overridden. But, certainly, Arthrex's

 5 position wouldn't change any of that. That is,

 6 holding that the APJs are principal officers who

 7 must be appointed by the President with Senate

 8 confirmation wouldn't give the President any

 9 greater power of control over their decisions in

10 the event that they were inconsistent with the

11 policy of the agencies.

12 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** We're -- we're back

13 to removal. Thank -- thank you, Mr. Stewart.

14 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

15 Kavanaugh.

16 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Thank you, Chief

17 Justice.

18 And good morning, Mr. Stewart. I'm

19 not sure this wolf comes as a wolf, Mr. Stewart,

20 but I still think it may be a wolf, as Justice

21 Scalia famously said, and he said, in those

22 cases, it can be discerned by careful and

23 perceptive analysis.

24 So here's why -- here -- here's the

25 sources of my concern on that front. First,

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 22

 1 this structure is a real break from tradition,

 2 which we've said in cases like Free Enterprise

 3 Fund and many others, perhaps the most telling

 4 indication of a constitutional problem is the

 5 departure -- the lack of historical precedent.

 6 The lack of agency review of the ALJ decision by

 7 someone who's appointed by the President with

 8 advice and consent of the Senate is absent here

 9 and is ordinarily present and historically has

10 been present.

11 And then, second, the lack of

12 accountability, as the Chief Justice said and

13 Justice Gorsuch was just saying, these are

14 multimillion, sometimes billion-dollar decisions

15 being made not by someone who's accountable in

16 the usual way that the Appointments Clause

17 demands. And the director, on rehearing, does

18 not have the unilateral power to reverse.

19 So, you know, if Congress is going to

20 do that, they can eliminate agency review and

21 prevent removal at will, then it's easy to make

22 these AL -- APJs presidentially appointed and

23 Senate-confirmed. They haven't done that.

24 Where -- where in that analysis have

25 things -- has that analysis gone wrong?

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 23

 1 **MR. STEWART:** I guess the -- the two

 2 or three things I would say are, first, it isn't

 3 unusual for administrative adjudicators to be

 4 appointed in the manner that's appropriate for

 5 inferior officers. Indeed, I think that --

 6 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** I -- I agree with

 7 that, but it is very unusual for them not to

 8 have agency review, as you well know.

 9 **MR. STEWART:** It certainly is the norm

10 for the -- the agency head to have the capacity

11 to -- to review their decisions. But, as we

12 know from Edmond, that doesn't have to be

13 plenary review. The -- the Court in Edmond

14 specifically addressed the fact that the Court

15 of Appeals for the Armed Forces could not

16 revisit the factual determinations of the Coast

17 Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, and it said

18 what's more important is that there is review,

19 not that review is not plenary.

20 And, in addition, the director has

21 substantial authority to instruct the judges as

22 to matters of law, as to the director's own

23 interpretation of the patent laws, and can

24 insist that the judges comply with that, those

25 instructions.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 24

 1 The other thing I would say is, if you

 2 think that that is the constitutional problem

 3 and if you think the constitutional rule is some

 4 Senate-confirmed official has to have plenary

 5 authority to revisit the decisions of -- of the

 6 underlings, then the appropriate remedy would be

 7 to sever the provision in the statute that says

 8 only the board can grant rehearings.

 9 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Thank you,

10 Mr. Stewart.

11 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

12 Barrett.

13 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Good morning,

14 Mr. Stewart. On page 38 of your brief, you talk

15 about the strength of the removal power, and you

16 say that because there's an efficiency-of-

17 service standard applicable here and because the

18 director can promulgate regulations, the

19 violation of which might be cause for firing,

20 that those are ways in which the director can

21 exercise some back-end control of the APJs with

22 whom he's not happy with their performance.

23 But isn't it the case, you know, as

24 Arthrex points out, that APJs get the protection

25 of the MSPB, which means that, at the end of the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 25

 1 day, the director is actually not the official

 2 in the Executive Branch that has the last word

 3 on the continuation in service?

 4 **MR. STEWART:** It's certainly true that

 5 the APJs would have -- if they were removed from

 6 federal service altogether, they would have the

 7 protections of the MSPB. And I'd say two things

 8 about removal. First, in addition to removing

 9 APJs from federal service altogether, the

10 director can remove them from their judicial

11 assignments. And the Court in Edmond said that

12 was an important power of control, and that

13 doesn't carry with it a right to MSPB review.

14 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Well, and I --

15 actually, I wanted to ask you about that. What

16 does that mean to remove them from their

17 judicial assignments when it's -- APJs' judicial

18 assignments are what they do? Are they just

19 benched without pay --

20 **MR. STEWART:** There are --

21 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** -- or benched with

22 pay?

23 **MR. STEWART:** -- there are two things

24 that could be done. First, they could be

25 assigned tasks such as rulemaking, training

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 26

 1 other employees, and APJs do sometimes perform

 2 those tasks.

 3 The second thing is Arthrex appears to

 4 concede that there's no constitutional problem

 5 with the PTAB adjudicating direct appeals from

 6 denial of patent applications. Arthrex

 7 acknowledges there's sufficient director control

 8 in that area that there's not a constitutional

 9 problem. And so particular APJs could very

10 feasibly be assigned to that kind of

11 adjudicative work rather than to inter partes

12 review, and that would --

13 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** I mean, is that

14 sufficient control? The director is unhappy

15 with some of the decisions on review and

16 rehearing, and so he says, okay, well, from now

17 on, you can still do adjudicative --

18 adjudicatory work, but it's going to be, you

19 know, this kind instead?

20 **MR. STEWART:** Yes, I mean, especially

21 if the director thought the problem with these

22 officials is that in inter partes reviews they

23 are not being sufficiently compliant with the

24 director's instructions.

25 The other thing I would say about the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 27

 1 removal provision is that, in addition to

 2 providing a practical tool for control, the fact

 3 that the APJs are subject to the same removal

 4 protection as officers and employees generally

 5 indicates that Congress didn't intend for them

 6 to -- to have any sort of special independence

 7 from -- from the director.

 8 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** A minute to --

 9 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Thank you,

10 Mr. Stewart.

11 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** -- a minute to

12 wrap up, Mr. Stewart.

13 **MR. STEWART:** Thank you, Mr. Chief

14 Justice.

15 This Court has emphasized that there

16 is no exclusive criterion for inferior officer

17 status, that the inquiry should examine all the

18 tools of control taken together. Here, the

19 director has substantial tools of control well

20 before a final written decision is issued.

21 The director has a power that the

22 Judge Advocate -- neither the Judge Advocate

23 General nor the Court of Appeals for the Armed

24 Forces had in Edmond, namely, the -- the ability

25 to issue binding instructions that will provide

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 28

 1 rules of decision for administrative patent

 2 judges as they decide cases.

 3 Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

 4 ((bold)) Mr. Perry.

 5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MARK A. PERRY

 6 ON BEHALF OF SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL.

 7 **MR. PERRY:** Mr. Chief Justice, and may

 8 it please the Court:

 9 Arthrex's proposal for a bright-line

10 administrative review requirement rests on a

11 single line from Edmond noting that the military

12 judges couldn't render a final decision unless

13 permitted to do so by other executive officers.

14 The Court in that sentence was not

15 announcing a requirement for inferior officer

16 status. It was commenting on the narrow scope

17 of CAAF review, which followed its observation

18 that the JAG could not provide advance guidance

19 to the military judges.

20 In sharp contrast, the PTO director

21 can and does give substantive guidance to APJs.

22 He also has unilateral institution and

23 assignment power, and he can order review of any

24 board decision.

25 Moreover, only the director takes

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 29

 1 final actions by confirming or canceling patent

 2 claims. APJs can't render any decision unless

 3 the director permits them to do so. They are

 4 inferior officers.

 5 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Mr. Perry, if

 6 you won one of these adjudications, you know, in

 7 a case involving a billion dollars, which you

 8 can have, as Justice Kavanaugh pointed out, you

 9 know, you're going to call your client and say,

10 we won the adjudication, and they're going to

11 celebrate. And the next day, you're going to

12 have to call him and say, ah, the director has

13 granted rehearing, he's appointed himself and

14 two others just that think the same way he does

15 to the panel, he's issued new guidance saying in

16 a so-called hypothetical case that looks like

17 ours it should come out the other way, and --

18 and the APJ who decided your case is sent to

19 Siberia.

20 You would say that that's not good

21 news, and I -- it would make something of a

22 charade out of the adjudication. Yet you're

23 relying on all those powers to say that

24 everything is -- is all right.

25 I mean, it -- it -- it really doesn't

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 30

 1 sound like any kind of adjudication that we

 2 would accept, you know, in a system

 3 characterized by due process.

 4 **MR. PERRY:** Mr. Chief Justice, whether

 5 or not there are due process considerations in

 6 any particular determination has nothing to do

 7 with the Appointments Clause question here,

 8 right? We have a structural allocation of power

 9 from the President through the Secretary through

10 the director to the APJs that is being respected

11 and being followed in the chain of command.

12 Due process is a separate issue, not

13 presented in the petition, not presented in this

14 case. There may well be due process problems in

15 other cases, but that's not a reason to dilute

16 or pollute the Appointments Clause.

17 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

18 Thomas.

19 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Thank you, Mr. Chief

20 Justice.

21 What would be your test for whether

22 someone is an -- an inferior officer? The -- it

23 seems to be almost a totality of the

24 circumstances.

25 **MR. PERRY:** Justice Thomas, the --

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 31

 1 the -- the principal officers sit at the right

 2 hand of the President. They -- the only ones

 3 this Court has recognized are the ambassadors

 4 and the cabinet officers, and the heads of

 5 agencies --

 6 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Yes.

 7 **MR. PERRY:** -- are one step removed.

 8 These individuals are three steps

 9 removed. So, you know, the Secretary definitely

10 is. The director may be. The APJs definitely

11 are not. And that's the chain of command that

12 the Court has described over and over again.

13 That would be one test.

14 The other, the -- the Edmond totality-

15 of-the-circumstances test is supervision and

16 control. And these officials are supervised and

17 controlled in everything they do.

18 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** And how much

19 supervision and control are you talking about?

20 Can it be partial supervision? Can it -- does

21 it have to be absolute supervision? I don't --

22 it's really difficult to discern how much would

23 be required under your test.

24 **MR. PERRY:** Your Honor, the -- the

25 ultimate test is whether the President and his

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 33-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 32

 1 direct reports remain accountable for the

 2 operations of the agency. So, if the Congress

 3 were to give total free reign to a -- to a

 4 sleeper agent embedded within the agency, that

 5 might be a problem.

 6 But where the chain of command is

 7 preserved and the director and ultimately the

 8 Secretary and the President bear the

 9 responsibility and accountability, that is

10 sufficient. And the totality of the

11 circumstances here show that the latter is the

12 case with respect to the Patent Office.

13 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Thank you.

14 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

15 Breyer.

16 **JUSTICE BREYER:** I'm just curious if

17 you found other examples like the JAG example

18 where the -- say the -- the Senior Executive

19 Service, members of that have a lot of authority

20 in dozens of different areas and in different

21 kinds of officials, and did you find any good

22 examples which would help you where they do have

23 in certain areas authority that really seems

24 pretty unreviewable?

25 **MR. PERRY:** Well, Your Honor, many

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 34-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 33

 1 executive officials, of course, have essentially

 2 unreviewable authority over narrow things.

 3 AUSAs, for example, get to make on-the-call

 4 decisions every day in court.

 5 And remember we're making very narrow

 6 decisions here. The ultimate -- what the Board

 7 decided in this case is that the priority date

 8 of this patent was May 8, 2014. That is not a

 9 decision that our constitution requires to be

10 made by a principal officer or even reviewed by

11 a principal officer.

12 It's a narrow, case-specific, factual

13 question that the board answered and we believe

14 answered correctly. So -- so the answer to your

15 question is, yes, there are many such officers,

16 but -- but they are generally given the

17 opportunity to decide narrow, case-specific,

18 application-specific questions rather than broad

19 questions of national policy. That -- that's

20 the dividing line in our government.

21 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Thank you.

22 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice Alito.

23 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Mr. Perry, your brief

24 has a very interesting metaphor. You say that

25 the test here is a Goldilocks test, is it -- is

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 35-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 34

 1 it too hot? So -- and you also in your brief

 2 tick off all the ways in which there is control

 3 over -- over these APJs. So I -- I'm going to

 4 go through these, go through your list and

 5 eliminate them one by one, and you tell me

 6 the -- when to stop, when we get to the point

 7 where we've crossed the line and there's no

 8 longer sufficient control.

 9 All right. So let's say that the

10 director does not control whether to institute

11 IPRs in the first place. He does not control

12 how many and which APJs sit on which panels. He

13 does not provide exemplary applications of

14 patent law to fact patterns that are binding on

15 APJs.

16 He does not control whether a panel's

17 decision will be precedential. He does not

18 direct whether a panel's decision will be

19 reheard by controlling whether a Precedential

20 Opinion Panel on which he sits votes to rehear a

21 case.

22 He does not control how many and which

23 APJs rehear a case. He does not decide whether

24 to dismiss an entire APR proceeding rather than

25 allow a panel's decision to become final.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 36-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 35

 1 Where -- where along that line did --

 2 did we cross the Rubicon?

 3 **MR. PERRY:** Your Honor, of course, the

 4 director has all those powers, and any one of

 5 them might be removed. If all of them were

 6 removed, then you'd have the sleeper agent I

 7 described. And every case has to be determined

 8 based on the powers Congress has actually

 9 conferred.

10 And, here, the suite of powers

11 together, including one the Court didn't

12 mention, which is the director's final authority

13 to confirm or cancel the patent claims, ensure

14 that the political accountability rests at all

15 times with the director, not with the APJs.

16 **JUSTICE ALITO:** But you can't tell me

17 where along that line is the magic divider?

18 **MR. PERRY:** Your Honor, if you want a

19 magic divider, I would suggest it is the -- the

20 relationship to the President. An officer three

21 steps removed from the President is -- is never

22 or almost never going to be a principal officer

23 because he is a subordinate.

24 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Thank you.

25 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 37-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 36

 1 Sotomayor.

 2 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** Counsel, Justice

 3 Gorsuch asked a question of your -- of -- of the

 4 assistant solicitor -- solicitor general about

 5 the right or the need to have someone in the

 6 direct control of the President.

 7 I'm assuming that that -- as I've been

 8 thinking about that question, I wonder, isn't

 9 that totally at odds with an adjudicatory system

10 of any kind?

11 **MR. PERRY:** Justice Sotomayor, there

12 is a -- you know, an inherent tension in agency

13 adjudicatory-type proceedings between

14 adjudicative independence and presidential

15 control, and that balance can be struck by

16 Congress in many, many ways and throughout

17 history has been struck in many, many ways so

18 long as the channels of authority are preserved.

19 I'll come back to what Mr. Stewart

20 said, it's the advance offering of guidance is

21 more important in this context. For example,

22 the director can identify problems coming out of

23 PTAB panels and direct future PTAB panels not to

24 make those mistakes, preserves both the

25 political accountability and avoids those due

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 38-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 37

 1 process-type problems that may arise in

 2 individual circumstances. That is the essence

 3 of supervision, which is carried out every day

 4 at the PTAB and in the Patent Office.

 5 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** Thank you,

 6 counsel.

 7 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice Kagan.

 8 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Mr. Perry, Justice

 9 Kavanaugh mentioned to you that this is an

10 unusual kind of structure with no automatic

11 opportunity for review in the agency head.

12 And I was -- I was just wondering,

13 is -- is there a story behind this? I mean, how

14 did this come to be? And is there anything that

15 we should take from that, or is this just an

16 unaccountably strange bird?

17 **MR. PERRY:** It is the long and proud

18 history of the Patent Office, Justice Kagan.

19 The interference examiners, about whom Arthrex

20 never wants to talk, going back to 1836,

21 administrative agents have decided

22 interferences, conflicts between two private

23 parties over patentability, including priority

24 date, the issue in this case, and they have

25 always been appointed by the Secretary, in 1870,

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 39-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 38

 1 in 1952, in 1975, in 2008. There's no question

 2 that those issues have always been decided by

 3 inferior officers, much of that time, since

 4 1939, in the interference context, without

 5 director review. And -- and that's what has

 6 been carried forward into the modern tradition.

 7 So we have a patent-specific

 8 tradition. It comes out of the examination

 9 process, right? These are sort of super

10 examiners or review examiners or second-level

11 examiners, and that's -- and the examiners, of

12 course, decide these same questions in the first

13 line, and they're employees, not even officers.

14 So the tradition we think that's

15 relevant is that of the Patent Office. And the

16 modern APJs are very much in line with a long,

17 long history that, in fact, stretches all the

18 way back to the founding.

19 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** And has Congress ever

20 taken a look at this? Do we know that Congress

21 has considered this and -- and knows what's

22 going on? And has it ever reached a

23 determination on the Appointments Clause

24 question?

25 **MR. PERRY:** We do know, Justice Kagan.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 40-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 39

 1 Congress for a brief period vested the

 2 appointment in the director and then changed it

 3 to the Secretary to avoid Appointments Clause

 4 problems -- there's a provision in the statute

 5 speaking of that -- and -- and specifically

 6 decided that they are inferior officers who can

 7 and should be appointed by the Secretary. And

 8 that determination, we think, is entitled to a

 9 certain amount of deference.

10 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Thank you, Mr. Perry.

11 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

12 Gorsuch.

13 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Mr. Perry, I

14 understand you and your colleagues from the

15 other side disagree a little bit over the patent

16 interference question and the history here, but,

17 in answer to Justice Kagan, is it -- is it fair

18 to say that, yes, this is a rare bird in that in

19 this area, maybe for historically contingent

20 reasons maybe considered, maybe not, this is an

21 unusual animal in the sense that there isn't

22 final review in the agency head?

23 **MR. PERRY:** Well, there is

24 reviewability in the agency head, but, Justice

25 Gorsuch, to directly answer your question, since

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 41-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 40

 1 the APA was enacted in 1946, most agency

 2 adjudications follow either the APA 556, 557

 3 categories or a close proxy. And the Patent

 4 Office doesn't.

 5 Of course, before that, there were

 6 many others. That's why the APA was enacted.

 7 And we would submit that the Appointments Clause

 8 is not a super APA. It doesn't require the

 9 President or Congress to follow the APA in any

10 particular case.

11 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Is that a long way

12 of saying yes, that this area is, if not sui

13 generis, very, very unusual?

14 **MR. PERRY:** It is unusual, but it is

15 also well and historically founded and -- and,

16 until now, unchallenged.

17 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Okay. And with

18 respect to the soft power that -- that is

19 sometimes emphasized that the director may have

20 over appointing different APJs or extracting

21 promises from certain APJs about how they'll

22 rule, do you admit that there might well be due

23 process problems there?

24 **MR. PERRY:** We certainly think that

25 the PTAB structure and -- and the decisions are

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 42-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 41

 1 subject to due process constraints, and that

 2 would be a legitimate source of concern if those

 3 kinds of issues arose. There is no such

 4 question or allegation or concern in this case.

 5 This is -- this is only a structural

 6 Appointments Clause question. Absolutely, they

 7 are, of course, subject to the Due Process

 8 Clause and all of its constraints.

 9 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Thank you.

10 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

11 Kavanaugh.

12 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Thank you, Chief

13 Justice.

14 Good morning, Mr. Perry. You

15 mentioned that the other side's argument rests

16 on a single line from Edmond. That, of course,

17 is the critical line from Edmond about the

18 administrative judge context.

19 Just to pick up on Justice Gorsuch,

20 this does seem, and I think you acknowledged, a

21 -- a significant departure from general

22 historical practice since the APA, which is a

23 yellow flag, if not a red flag.

24 And then your test to try to deal with

25 that seems to resurrect Morrison v. Olson's

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 43-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 42

 1 test. I thought we'd gotten away from that in

 2 -- in Edmond. Justice Alito's questions pointed

 3 that out.

 4 And what I'm worried about -- this is

 5 the wolf. What I'm worried about is this gives

 6 a model for Congress to eliminate agency review

 7 of ALJ decisions and kind of fragment and take

 8 away from agency control going forward, because

 9 this -- however this came about, to Justice

10 Kagan's question, this would be a model going

11 forward, and that would allow Congress to give

12 extraordinary power to inferior officers, which

13 is not how our government is ordinarily

14 structured.

15 And then, to Justice Sotomayor's

16 question, it seems like ALJs, there's two --

17 there's two fixes. You can go with the

18 executive model of ALJs, which is the

19 traditional have ALJs and have agency review or

20 removability, it's usually agency review, not

21 removability with ALJs; or you can make the APJs

22 principal officers with presidential appointment

23 and Senate advice and consent if you want a more

24 judicial model.

25 But, here, the -- this hybrid gives

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 44-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 43

 1 enormous power to inferior officers, and it's

 2 really just out of the norm. Your response?

 3 **MR. PERRY:** Two responses, Justice

 4 Kavanaugh.

 5 First, this system fits neatly within,

 6 we would submit, Justice Scalia's dissent in

 7 Morrison versus Olson, particularly Footnote 4

 8 and the surrounding text describing the role of

 9 subordinate officers and the interplay with

10 removal powers.

11 Second, I cannot emphasize enough that

12 the director maintains the final authority under

13 318(b) to confirm or cancel any patent. The

14 APJs do not cancel patents. The patent in this

15 case is still valid. The board has declared it

16 to be unpatentable, but the director has not

17 canceled it. So, to this day, three years

18 later, nothing has happened because the

19 director, the politically appointed directly

20 accountable to the President individual, has not

21 taken the action specified by statute.

22 The Congress has made a different

23 determination here, but it is absolutely

24 consistent with the dictates of the Appointments

25 Clause.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 45-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 44

 1 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Thank you.

 2 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

 3 Barrett.

 4 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Good morning,

 5 Mr. Perry. So I want you to assume for the

 6 purposes of my question that you lose on the

 7 Appointments Clause issue, and I want to ask you

 8 about remedy.

 9 So, you know, the federal -- well,

10 think about -- one unusual thing about the

11 remedy here is that it's not one specific

12 provision in this statutory scheme that's being

13 challenged as unconstitutional. It's the way

14 that they work together.

15 You know, so we could, if we decided

16 that it was unconstitutional, perhaps make all

17 of the APJs subject to -- say they're principal

18 officers, and so they have to be subject to

19 presidential appointment, senatorial

20 confirmation. We could say, listen, we're going

21 to strike the provision in the statute that says

22 only the PTAB may grant rehearings so that the

23 director has that authority. We could make them

24 maybe at-will employees, so they're removable at

25 the discretion of the director without having to

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 46-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 45

 1 go through the full process that we discussed

 2 before.

 3 That's a lot of discretion to give us

 4 in trying to shape a remedial -- a remedy here.

 5 Why should we even assert the authority to do

 6 that, to sever?

 7 **MR. PERRY:** Justice Barrett, the --

 8 the -- from my perspective from -- from, you

 9 know, where we think the statute, of course, is

10 constitutional -- and I don't mean to be flip --

11 but, if you tell me how we lose, we can tell you

12 what the remedy is.

13 So, for example, if the real problem

14 here is the lack of agency reviewability, then

15 the most direct line to a solution would be to

16 sever the provision requiring board rehearing so

17 that the director could unilaterally review.

18 And there may be other remedies

19 depending on where, if anywhere, the Court were

20 to find a constitutional violation. It is not

21 where the Federal Circuit found it.

22 And it's certainly not where Arthrex

23 has identified it, which is to take down this

24 whole system. You know, they don't actually

25 want presidential confirmation. They don't

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 47-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 46

 1 actually want director review. What they want

 2 is for the Court to -- to blow up the whole

 3 thing because of a structural problem that,

 4 again, not to fight the hypothetical, we think

 5 doesn't exist.

 6 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Thank you.

 7 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** A minute to

 8 wrap up, Mr. Perry.

 9 **MR. PERRY:** Mr. Chief Justice,

10 principal executive officers sit at the right

11 hand of the President and make national policy.

12 They are the ambassadors, the cabinet members,

13 and the agency heads who have no superior other

14 than the President.

15 The APJs here are three steps away

16 from the President. The chain of command runs

17 through the Secretary of Commerce and the PTO

18 Director.

19 This Court has consistently recognized

20 subordinate officials in general and

21 administrative adjudicators in particular to be

22 inferior officers. APJs carry out policy. They

23 do not make it. Findings like these have been

24 made by inferior officers since the Patent

25 Office was created, and APJs carry on that

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 48-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 47

 1 tradition. They are inferior officers.

 2 Thank you.

 3 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you,

 4 counsel.

 5 Mr. Lamken.

 6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY A. LAMKEN

 7 ON BEHALF OF ARTHREX, INC.

 8 **MR. LAMKEN:** Thank you, Mr. Chief

 9 Justice, and may it please the Court:

10 Administrative patent judges do one

11 thing: decide cases. Their decisions are the

12 executive's final word resolving billion-dollar

13 disputes affecting the innovation landscape.

14 They can even overturn earlier decisions by

15 their own agency head to grant a patent.

16 No superior in the executive has

17 authority to review their decisions, to overturn

18 their exercise of government authority.

19 Accountability suffers. If a principal officer

20 has review authority but refuses to exercise it

21 and overrule subordinates, the President and the

22 public can hold him accountable for that choice.

23 But the principal is not accountable

24 if the answer is, I have no authority. Congress

25 made my supposed underlings the final word.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 49-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 48

 1 Punishing APJs for decisions or guidance to

 2 prevent future error doesn't undo decisions

 3 already made. For parties, the decision remains

 4 the executive's final word.

 5 In 200 years, this Court has never

 6 upheld such a scheme. Edmond emphasizes review

 7 by presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed

 8 officers. It's hard to imagine the Coast Guard

 9 judges there would be inferior officers if none

10 of their decisions could ever be countermanded

11 by a superior, which is why the Federal

12 Circuit's remedy striking APJ tenure protection

13 is no remedy at all. APJs would still be the

14 final word of the executive for the cases they

15 decide, and it subjects APJs to unseen,

16 behind-the-scenes pressures through which

17 superiors could evade accountability.

18 How to fix the statute is for

19 Congress. Solutions point in the opposite

20 direction. Congress might want APJs to be

21 presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed,

22 as examiners-in-chief were for 114 years.

23 Congress might want to grant the director

24 express authority to read board panel decisions.

25 That's how Congress fixed the problem for the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 50-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 49

 1 Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, the TTAB,

 2 last year.

 3 But this Court can't pencil in those

 4 solutions. It's more respectful of Congress to

 5 allow Congress to choose how to structure the

 6 agency.

 7 I, of course, welcome the Court's

 8 questions.

 9 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you, Mr.

10 Lamken.

11 Why isn't it okay -- we've -- we -- I

12 think Justice Gorsuch referred to this as the

13 soft power of review. Why isn't -- under our

14 precedents and basic principles, why isn't it

15 okay that the executive allow the adjudicators a

16 significant degree of leeway because they're

17 just that? They're adjudicators, they're coming

18 up with particular factual determinations, and

19 you don't want the politically accountable

20 people to have the authority to overturn those

21 in -- in situations where billions of dollars

22 are at stake, but, at the same time, in terms of

23 basic patent rules and approaches and guidance,

24 you do want them to have that responsibility.

25 Why -- why isn't that a fair balance?

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 51-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 50

 1 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, Mr. Chief Justice,

 2 the Constitution permits adjudication in the

 3 Executive Branch in part because some

 4 adjudication is executive in nature. But

 5 placing that function in the executive means

 6 that the key protections against executive

 7 overreach, which is accountability to the people

 8 for the decisions, has to be observed.

 9 Allowing unaccountable officers to

10 decide those cases finally, stripping any

11 accountable principal of authority to overturn

12 them, defeats that structural protection.

13 Now the standard model for agency

14 structure achieves both the impartiality of the

15 initial decision and allows for principal

16 officer review, and it ensures that the

17 principal officer review after the fact has a

18 principal officer taking responsibility for his

19 decision to overturn the impartial adjudicator.

20 This, by contrast, comes up with a

21 situation where you really -- it doesn't make

22 sense because you really can't be an inferior

23 officer. You cannot be an inferior adjudicator

24 when there's no superior who can review any of

25 your decisions ever.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 52-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 51

 1 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Well, not any

 2 of your actual decisions, but can certainly take

 3 actions that would redirect any mistakes that

 4 the director sees in how a particular case was

 5 handled for the implementation of patent policy

 6 according to the President's directives, the

 7 President's responsibilities.

 8 **MR. LAMKEN:** A regulation or -- or

 9 punishment of the APJ after the fact simply

10 doesn't change the fact that the APJ's decision

11 is the final word in the case, the final word of

12 the executive.

13 So, for the parties aggrieved by the

14 loss of valuable rights, there's no superior

15 they can go to to ask them to countermand that

16 bad decision. For the public and aggrieved

17 parties wanting to know who to hold accountable

18 for the decision, there's just nobody.

19 The principal office -- officer's

20 response is, I have no authority to overturn

21 those bad decisions, Congress stripped me of

22 that power. That's the opposite of

23 accountability. It's the nature of adjudication

24 that you decide individual cases. If we're

25 going to have accountability in adjudication, it

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 53-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 52

 1 has to be accountability for individual cases.

 2 Structural protections like these

 3 protect individual liberty, so they have to

 4 apply in individual cases.

 5 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** What about the

 6 argument that, as a matter of practicality,

 7 which is something that the government has to

 8 take into account, what you're supposing is --

 9 is really quite impractical?

10 Hundreds and hundreds of

11 administrative hearing examiners, as at least

12 they used to be called, making these sorts of

13 decisions, the notion of meaningful review of

14 each one seems to me to be fanciful.

15 **MR. LAMKEN:** Mr. Chief Justice,

16 because the account -- the Appointments Clause

17 is about accountability, what matters is legal

18 authority. If the director thinks he's too busy

19 to review a decision, if the director thinks

20 they're too numerous to merit his attention, the

21 public and the President can hold him

22 accountable for that decision.

23 But, if the director's answer is, I

24 have no legal authority to review those

25 decisions, then he is not accountable at all.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 54-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 53

 1 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you,

 2 counsel.

 3 Justice Thomas.

 4 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Mr. Lamken, why does

 5 that accountability matter in this case? Are

 6 you saying that you would actually get a better

 7 decision from the director?

 8 **MR. LAMKEN:** Your Honor, yes, we

 9 believe we would get a better decision from the

10 director. But what matters is for individuals

11 to understand when they are making these

12 decisions that they are subject to potential

13 review and reversal by -- by their principal

14 officer.

15 Absent that oversight, there isn't

16 sufficient guidance and control to ensure that

17 they are inferior officers. In the end, we're

18 ultimately entitled to a decision where a

19 principal officer appointed by and accountable

20 to the President has authority to review the

21 decision. Absent that --

22 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** So how much review

23 are you talking about? Is it -- can it be just

24 pro forma review? Rubber-stamp review? How

25 much review are you talking about to address

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 55-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 54

 1 your concerns?

 2 **MR. LAMKEN:** I -- I think the -- it's

 3 the availability of review. This Court -- the

 4 lower federal courts don't cease to be inferior

 5 courts merely because this Court denies

 6 certiorari in the vast majority of cases. It is

 7 the availability of review that makes them

 8 inferior courts and this Court the Supreme

 9 Court. And so it doesn't have to be actual

10 review in any case.

11 But, in Ed -- in Edmond, for example,

12 review is limited to issues of law, and if there

13 is -- so long as there is sufficient evidence on

14 every element of the offense, then the -- the

15 higher court couldn't overturn it. And so,

16 presumably, under proper circumstances, that

17 would be an appropriate standard.

18 But what you can't have is what we

19 have here, which is not only can you not remove

20 the lower -- the supposedly lower officers, but

21 the director simply does not have authority to

22 overturn their decisions no matter how

23 vehemently he may disagree with -- he may

24 disagree with them.

25 In fact, he, at most, in any rehearing

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 56-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 55

 1 sits on a panel of two -- three, where he is

 2 outnumbered two to one by other inferior

 3 officers.

 4 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** So, if I understand

 5 you, if Congress amended the relevant provision

 6 and gave discretion to the director, you -- that

 7 would solve your problem?

 8 **MR. LAMKEN:** That's exactly how --

 9 yes, that's exactly how Congress fixed the

10 problem for the Trademark Trial and Appeals

11 Board. It provided -- inserted an express

12 provision saying that the director has authority

13 to overturn board decisions with which the

14 director disagrees.

15 But this Court can't pencil in that

16 sort of authority. The government attempts to

17 get there by asserting that the Court should

18 strike, for example, the -- the provision that

19 says that only the board can grant a rehearing,

20 but that wouldn't fix the problem at all.

21 The only person that would --

22 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Well, let me ask you

23 one more question then. The -- assuming that

24 Congress addresses the problem by providing the

25 director with discretion, could the director

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 57-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 56

 1 then delegate that authority to the APJs and the

 2 various structures within the organization to

 3 basically the way it exists now by statute, but

 4 the -- the director accomplishes that by

 5 delegation? Would that be okay?

 6 **MR. LAMKEN:** Your Honor, I think,

 7 since the statute authorizes his review, that

 8 would be permissible so long as it's consistent

 9 with the statute, because the public and the

10 President could hold the director accountable

11 for his --

12 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** So, I mean, if you

13 could be in the exact same posture that you're

14 in right now, as long as he does it by

15 delegation rather than by statute?

16 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, it wouldn't be the

17 exact same posture, Your Honor, because, if it's

18 by delegation, he could always withdraw that

19 delegation. If it's by delegation, he is

20 accountable for having done the delegation. He

21 cannot point his finger at Congress and say:

22 Congress deprived me of the power to overturn

23 that decision. It would be his choice to not

24 review the decision, his choice to delegate, his

25 choice for which he is accountable to the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 58-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 57

 1 President and the people of the United States.

 2 **JUSTICE THOMAS:** Thank you.

 3 **MR. LAMKEN:** What's missing --

 4 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

 5 Breyer.

 6 **JUSTICE BREYER:** But following up on

 7 what Justice Thomas says, I mean, I don't -- why

 8 is this an unusual matter of delegation? I

 9 mean, after all, the government is filled with

10 all kinds of different people. Doctors in

11 practice may have final authority to decide at

12 the Veterans Administration whether you're on

13 your right day for an appointment. Sergeants

14 will decide what hill to take in the Army.

15 Inspectors general may decide who is a

16 whistleblower and have absolutely unreviewable

17 authority to send something over to Congress to

18 say what that whistleblower said. There are

19 many shapes and sizes.

20 And some -- and Congress -- I mean,

21 you're saying Congress can't restrict their

22 authority at all, no matter what the shape and

23 what the size? Or can they do it --

24 **MR. LAMKEN:** Justice --

25 **JUSTICE BREYER:** -- sometimes and not

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 59-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 58

 1 do it other times? And if so, when?

 2 **MR. LAMKEN:** So, Justice --

 3 **JUSTICE BREYER:** I mean, it's just

 4 pretty complicated.

 5 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- Justice Breyer, I

 6 think when you're talking about an adjudication,

 7 what's critical is the authority of a principal

 8 officer to be able to overturn that -- the

 9 decision --

10 **JUSTICE BREYER:** But not for a doctor,

11 not for a whistleblower?

12 **MR. LAMKEN:** No, for -- for policy

13 decisions --

14 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Ah.

15 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- that sort of

16 regulatory decision, it's often sufficient for

17 you to have removal authority or the threat of

18 removal, because those decisions can be

19 overturned --

20 **JUSTICE BREYER:** True, but --

21 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- even once the --

22 **JUSTICE BREYER:** -- I mean, what about

23 the inspector general? Can the Congress there

24 give him some unreviewable authority, send him a

25 letter with a whistleblower?

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 60-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 59

 1 **MR. LAMKEN:** So, of course, anybody

 2 who has oversight can always overturn any --

 3 that -- that sort of --

 4 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Let's say --

 5 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- executive authority.

 6 **JUSTICE BREYER:** -- Congress delegates

 7 to the inspector general the unreviewable power

 8 to decide whether to send a letter to Congress

 9 at the request of a whistleblower.

10 **MR. LAMKEN:** Yeah, I don't think --

11 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Can Congress do that

12 or not on your theory?

13 **MR. LAMKEN:** So I think that sending a

14 letter to Congress may or may not be substantial

15 governmental authority of the sort that would be

16 --

17 **JUSTICE BREYER:** Oh, okay, okay. But

18 --

19 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- be an issue here.

20 **JUSTICE BREYER:** -- now we've got --

21 we're finding out what you're looking for, the

22 other side is saying this: Given the complexity

23 of the federal government, of course, there are

24 going to be vast numbers of different cases, so

25 we have three basic things to look at: What's

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 61-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 60

 1 the position in respect to the President of the

 2 individual? What's the nature of that job? And

 3 what is the nature of the delegation of

 4 non-reviewable authority?

 5 I mean, even magistrates and lower

 6 court judges decide things without review, such

 7 as a denial of summary judgment. What's the

 8 nature of the authority delegated, what's the

 9 nature of the job, what's the distance from the

10 President, and it all comes under the rubric

11 policy.

12 Is it taking too many policy matters

13 away from the President? So an adjudicator will

14 have more authority, possible. And so will a

15 whistleblower, inspector general. And maybe

16 somebody else won't. Maybe somebody in the

17 Nuclear Regulatory -- do you see -- do you see

18 what they're driving at? So what's your

19 response to that?

20 **MR. LAMKEN:** Justice Breyer, I think,

21 when you have adjudications, it's just in the

22 nature of adjudications that you decide

23 individual cases. And if you're going to have

24 accountability in those decisions, which you

25 must if you're in the Executive Branch, that

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 62-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 61

 1 accountability has to be for individual

 2 decisions.

 3 And if you -- if you have an -- a

 4 supposed underling with unreviewable authority

 5 to decide the matter, you do not have

 6 accountability of a superior. You simply can't

 7 be an inferior adjudicator if there is no

 8 superior who can review any of your decisions

 9 ever.

10 The Constitution uses the word

11 "inferior" only in the -- the context of the

12 lower federal courts. Those courts are inferior

13 because their decisions are subject to this

14 Court's review.

15 If there were courts out there where

16 this Court would have no authority to review

17 their decisions ever, under any circumstances,

18 they might be lesser or coordinate courts. They

19 wouldn't be inferior courts.

20 For adjudication, being an inferior

21 means having a superior who can review and

22 overturn your decisions.

23 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice Alito.

24 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Mr. Lamken, let's

25 assume that we agree with you that this current

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 63-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 62

 1 scheme violates the Appointments Clause. You

 2 say in your brief we shouldn't go any further;

 3 we should leave it to Congress to decide what to

 4 do to fix the problem.

 5 But that really doesn't answer the

 6 question of what relief you should get in this

 7 case. I -- I assume you would not be satisfied

 8 if, at the end of this case, the only thing that

 9 you obtain is a declaration that the current

10 scheme is unconstitutional, but nothing is done

11 to disturb the decision of the board, right?

12 You wouldn't be satisfied with that?

13 **MR. LAMKEN:** Correct. That would be

14 essentially an advisory opinion for us. Because

15 the Court -- because the IPR system is

16 unconstitutional, this case can't proceed,

17 there's no constitutional mechanism to which

18 this case can be remanded. Accordingly, the IPR

19 really should be dismissed.

20 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Well, you -- you want

21 us to go beyond simply saying that there was a

22 violation and, Congress, you fix it as you see

23 fit. You want us to grant -- you want the

24 judiciary to grant you a form of relief, namely,

25 a decision vacating the decision of the board.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 64-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 63

 1 That is a form of relief.

 2 Why is that a more modest form of

 3 relief -- a more modest form of relief than some

 4 of the alternatives, such as saying that you are

 5 entitled to have the director review the

 6 decision of the board?

 7 **MR. LAMKEN:** Your Honor, I think the

 8 -- the Court couldn't create that mechanism

 9 without rewriting the statute. And --

10 **JUSTICE ALITO:** We wouldn't -- we

11 wouldn't rewrite the statute. What the Court

12 would say is this is what the Constitution

13 requires. The law is -- I mean, Professor

14 Harrison makes this point repeatedly, and it

15 seems like a convincing point. The law is a

16 combination of what the Constitution requires

17 and any statutory additions to what the

18 Constitution requires.

19 So, if the Constitution requires some

20 alteration of the current statutory scheme, so

21 be it. And that is an alteration that would

22 possibly bring this into compliance with the

23 Constitution.

24 **MR. LAMKEN:** I think -- Your Honor, I

25 believe there's, you know, the choice of how to

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 65-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 64

 1 have these decisions made. Whether or not you

 2 elevate APJs to have them appointed by the

 3 President, to make them true principal officers,

 4 or, conversely, whether you would instead

 5 subordinate them to the director by making their

 6 decisions reviewable by the director, is a sort

 7 of fundamental policy choice this Court does not

 8 make. Congress --

 9 **JUSTICE ALITO:** But -- but somebody

10 has to make a choice about -- somebody in the

11 judiciary has to make a choice about how this

12 case ends. And I -- I -- I don't think you can

13 -- I don't think it's an answer to say don't

14 make any choice at all, just say that we win.

15 That is a choice. That is a form of relief, is

16 it not?

17 **MR. LAMKEN:** Yes, yes. And it is a

18 form of relief, for example, this Court gave in

19 Sorrell. It said there's multiple possibilities

20 of how the statute could be changed, but we are

21 not the institution to be -- to doing it. The

22 legislature has to make that change.

23 And I think that's precisely the case

24 here because the possible solutions point in

25 diametrically opposite directions. One is to

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 66-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 65

 1 make the officers -- to -- to make the APJs

 2 appointed by the President so that you have --

 3 so they're true principal officers. The other

 4 would be to make them truly subordinate to the

 5 director by making their decisions not final and

 6 at least subject to the possibility of review by

 7 the director.

 8 But, since those and the multiple

 9 other possibilities point in such diametrically

10 opposed directions, this Court should hold that

11 this IPR cannot proceed because the system is

12 not constitutional. And then any remedy beyond

13 that, any revision to the statute would be a

14 matter for Congress to -- to address.

15 **JUSTICE ALITO:** All right. Thank --

16 thank you.

17 **MR. LAMKEN:** It's far more --

18 **JUSTICE ALITO:** Thank you, Mr. Lamken.

19 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

20 Sotomayor.

21 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** Counsel, I find it

22 odd -- not odd to protect Congress's

23 prerogative, but it's nothing that we do will

24 tie Congress's hands. And one thing we do know

25 is that they can change anything we do as a

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 67-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 66

 1 temporary remedy, assuming we were to rule in

 2 your favor.

 3 But I -- I have a problem with our

 4 jurisprudence as -- as it's developed in this --

 5 in -- in these cases. And the founding

 6 generation conceived of principal officers as

 7 synonymous with heads of departments. In early

 8 debates and enactments that structured executive

 9 department, heads of the department were -- were

10 referred to as principal officers and other

11 members as inferior officers. There's a whole

12 history that many of those inferior officers

13 took final decisions in a wide variety of areas.

14 Yet that's the way we proceeded.

15 The history also shows that early

16 statutes gave non-principal officers the power

17 to make final adjudicatory decisions on behalf

18 of the executive.

19 Your opposing counsel pointed out that

20 as early as 1793, non-principal officers were

21 given the power to adjudicate patent disputes,

22 and in 1803, land commissioners were given the

23 power to make final determinations as to a

24 claimant's right to a tract of land.

25 I personally read this history as

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 68-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 67

 1 suggesting that principal officers were intended

 2 to be policymakers, and individuals who merely

 3 adjudicated claims based on said policies were

 4 not principal officers.

 5 So, for me, the person that has to be

 6 held responsible is not the individual ILJ -- or

 7 ALJ who is making a decision. It's the person

 8 who creates the policy.

 9 And for me, it's clear that APJs are

10 not policymakers. All the policies are vested

11 in the director. Precedential power is put in

12 the director. The ALJs cannot influence the

13 course of the law. That's only the director.

14 So please tell me why the individual

15 decision based on a quasi-law precedent and

16 policy set by the director is a final decision

17 that that director won't be held responsible

18 for.

19 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, Your Honor, I think

20 the short answer is, if the director has no

21 authority to over -- overturn it, then the

22 director isn't responsible for it. It's not his

23 fault. And I think that in terms of history --

24 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** I -- I -- I'm

25 having a problem with that. If the APJ makes a

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 69-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 68

 1 mistake under the policy set by the director,

 2 that is going to be reviewed by the courts.

 3 **MR. LAMKEN:** Your Honor, it's -- these

 4 aren't -- these require applications of law to

 5 facts. There's credibility determinations. It

 6 doesn't make you an inferior officer simply

 7 because somebody in a coordinate branch could

 8 review your decisions.

 9 If that were the test, then the heads

10 of departments and the members of the cabinet

11 would be inferior officers also because their

12 decisions can be reviewed by the courts.

13 Under Edmond, to be an imperial --

14 inferior officer, you have to be subject to the

15 supervision and control of a principal officer.

16 That doesn't mean that you can only have one

17 single head of agency principal officer in any

18 -- in any agency.

19 Madison, as we pointed out in our

20 brief, expressly recognized the fact that you

21 could have other principal officers --

22 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** Counsel --

23 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- subordinate to the

24 heads of department.

25 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** -- just one last

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 70-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 69

 1 point. I just ignore the history under your

 2 view and --

 3 **MR. LAMKEN:** No.

 4 **JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:** -- what it teaches

 5 us.

 6 **MR. LAMKEN:** No, quite the opposite.

 7 I think the history, when -- of the arbitrators

 8 that you mentioned, they would decide just a

 9 single case, and that has two consequences.

10 First, because an arbitrator doesn't

11 have a continuing position, historically, they

12 would not be treated as an officer at all, as

13 the Alfmart and the 2007 OLC opinion made clear.

14 They're like jurors. Jurors have important

15 responsibilities for cases, but they're not

16 officers.

17 Second, because the role is only

18 temporary and for a single case, such an

19 arbitrator wouldn't be -- would at most be an

20 inferior officer, as under Morrison.

21 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice Kagan.

22 **MR. LAMKEN:** But whatever one thinks

23 about --

24 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Mr. Lamken, suppose

25 that there was review by the director in this

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 71-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 70

 1 case, but the review was under a clear error

 2 standard. Would that be enough?

 3 **MR. LAMKEN:** Your Honor, I think,

 4 consistent with Edmond, a clear error standard,

 5 legal, would probably be sufficient in light of

 6 the other means of control that the director

 7 has.

 8 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** And -- and how about

 9 if it was under an egregious error standard?

10 **MR. LAMKEN:** I think, Your Honor, at

11 some point, where the authority of the director

12 is so cut off that he is not able to say with

13 any accountability that the final decision of

14 the APJ represents the views of the United

15 States, that this is a decision that he is

16 willing to stand behind as the word of the PTO

17 --

18 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Well, then let's --

19 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- then I think, at that

20 point, you've got to --

21 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** -- let's think about

22 what you just said in reference to Edmond.

23 In Edmond, as you said -- and this is

24 why you said a clear error standard would have

25 to suffice -- the standard was is there

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 72-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 71

 1 competent evidence in the record.

 2 Now, if I think about that standard, I

 3 mean, when is there not competent evidence in

 4 the record?

 5 So I guess I'm wondering how Edmond is

 6 at all consistent with some of the statements

 7 that you've been making this -- this morning?

 8 You said that, you know, it's -- it's -- if --

 9 if the head of the agency can say he had no

10 authority, the head of -- if the head of the

11 agency can say it's not his fault, then that

12 is -- then that dooms the system.

13 But the CAAF could have said all those

14 things: we have no authority, it's not our

15 fault, there was competent evidence in -- in --

16 in the record. I mean, it wasn't very good

17 evidence and the evidence in our view was

18 outweighed by much better evidence, but it was

19 competent, so it's not our fault.

20 **MR. LAMKEN:** Your Honor, of course,

21 the CAAF could also review all errors of law,

22 and we would think that the PTO director would

23 have to be able to do that as well.

24 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Well, but with --

25 **MR. LAMKEN:** But the one --

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 73-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 72

 1 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** -- respect to many

 2 decisions, the -- the -- the critical question

 3 is what the evidence says, and, you know,

 4 putting aside whether there's -- there's de novo

 5 legal authority, you know, many decisions the

 6 CAAF would be able to say, you know, this was in

 7 the end a decision about the evidence, and we

 8 basically have no authority with respect to

 9 judgments about how good the evidence is. As

10 long as there's, like, something there, we have

11 to go along, it's not our fault.

12 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, Your Honor, I think

13 the answer is that one thing that Congress can't

14 do and still maintain you as an inferior officer

15 is to say that your adjudicative decisions are

16 not subject to review by any principal officer

17 under any circumstances.

18 That simply goes too far. And that's

19 what we have here. Plus, where the case --

20 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** I mean, I -- I guess

21 what I'm just wondering is whether this doesn't

22 suggest that this question of review is

23 something that's not an on/off switch as to this

24 single issue but something that needs to be put

25 into the mix and needs to be considered along

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 74-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 73

 1 with all the other evidence of -- of -- of

 2 control that the agency head has.

 3 The reason why this competent evidence

 4 standard was okay in Edmond was not that, you

 5 know, it itself was there because, you know,

 6 competent evidence standard doesn't give you

 7 much. It was because it was combined with a

 8 raft of other things.

 9 **MR. LAMKEN:** I think Your Honor is

10 correct in the sense that the ability to

11 review -- of a principal officer to review the

12 supposed inferior's decision is a critical but

13 perhaps not always sufficient condition.

14 But you really can't call them an

15 inferior officer if the answer is for the

16 superior, I have no authority to review your

17 decisions at all under any circumstances.

18 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** If we're being --

19 **MR. LAMKEN:** That wouldn't --

20 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** -- honest, Mr. Lamken,

21 wouldn't you think that the director can

22 probably get the precise result he wants in a

23 higher percentage of these cases than the CAAF

24 could have gotten in Edmond?

25 **MR. LAMKEN:** No, Your Honor, I don't

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 75-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 74

 1 think so, because, you know, for example, he

 2 cannot conceivably anticipate every conceivable

 3 factual scenario, every conceivable distinction,

 4 every single thing that an -- an adjudicator

 5 might come up with along the way.

 6 **JUSTICE KAGAN:** Thank you, Mr. Lamken.

 7 **MR. LAMKEN:** Just --

 8 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

 9 Gorsuch. Justice Gorsuch?

10 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Oh, I'm -- I'm

11 sorry.

12 Mr. Lamken, if you'd like to finish

13 that answer, I'd -- I'd -- I'd be grateful to

14 hear it.

15 **MR. LAMKEN:** Yes. He couldn't

16 possibly conceive -- come up with every

17 conceivable along the way. And the idea of, you

18 know, the fact that the government seems to try

19 and contrive together ways that the government

20 -- that -- excuse me, that the director could

21 possibly control the outcomes, for example,

22 front-running APJ decisions with pay-specific

23 guidance, manipulating panel size or panel

24 composition to achieve results, de-instituting

25 to try and avoid bad decisions, all those

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 76-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 75

 1 contrivances to try and give the director some

 2 sort of control just show that Congress didn't

 3 give the director the critical authority you

 4 need for adjudications: the authority to review

 5 and overturn decisions so he can stand behind

 6 them as the final word of the United States.

 7 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** So, Mr. Lamken, in

 8 our last couple of cases, Seila Law and Free

 9 Enterprise, we were able to get in and get out

10 rather cleanly, severing only the removal

11 provisions, and, of course, that took care of

12 the -- the constitutional problem there.

13 Here, you -- you indicate that

14 supervision is a real problem and more

15 machinations are required. But the SG offers us

16 a -- a -- what it thinks is a clean answer on I

17 think it's about page 40 of its brief that we --

18 we just sever the provision in Section 6(c) that

19 says only the PTAB may grant rehearing.

20 Why -- why isn't that sufficient?

21 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, Your Honor, first,

22 that's, of course, one of multiple options that

23 point in opposite directions, but it wouldn't

24 even fix the problem.

25 Even if the director -- that would

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 77-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 76

 1 somehow give the director the ability to grant a

 2 rehearing, despite the rule that the body with

 3 authority to decide cases initially usually has

 4 the authority to grant a hearing, not somebody

 5 else, but the director still wouldn't have

 6 unilateral authority to decide cases on

 7 rehearing. The statute still says decisions are

 8 issued in panels of three in which the director

 9 is, at best, outnumbered two to one.

10 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** All right. So we'd

11 have to --

12 **MR. LAMKEN:** So any --

13 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** -- we'd have to --

14 we'd have to blue-line not only that language in

15 6(c) that says only the PTAB, but you're also

16 pointing out that first part of Section 6(c)

17 that says shall be heard by three members, fine.

18 Is -- is that -- would -- would --

19 would that do it?

20 **MR. LAMKEN:** So, Your Honor --

21 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Would that solve the

22 problem.

23 **MR. LAMKEN:** Right. I think, you

24 know, Congress could rewrite the statute that

25 way. But trying to take the director and re --

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 78-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 77

 1 and insert him above the board, where Congress

 2 made him only one member, trying to insert the

 3 director as a single decision-maker, where

 4 Congress provided for people to sit in panels of

 5 three, that isn't a surgical solution. That's

 6 vivisection.

 7 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Are there other --

 8 **MR. LAMKEN:** Congress --

 9 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** -- are there other

10 portions of the statute we'd have to eliminate

11 or add to?

12 **MR. LAMKEN:** No, but it would still

13 rep -- I think that you would have to strike at

14 least those two, but that would be a radical

15 alteration of the scheme Congress established.

16 Panels of three were an important

17 protection against idiosyncratic thinking. They

18 ensure a necessary breadth of expertise. They

19 provide a check ensuring just -- that you have

20 decision-makers with different backgrounds. And

21 it would be a departure from historical practice

22 of having the -- having the APJs sit in panels

23 of three.

24 But, ultimately, the problem is

25 there's two opposite ways that one can go here.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 79-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 78

 1 One can elevate the APJs and provide for them to

 2 be presidentially appointed and be true

 3 principal officers, as examiners-in-chief were

 4 for 114 years, or you can try and subordinate

 5 them by making the director the final

 6 decision-maker and give him capacity to overturn

 7 decisions with which he disagrees.

 8 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Well, one --

 9 **MR. LAMKEN:** But that's --

10 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** -- one option you've

11 given -- one option you've given us is to simply

12 set aside the IPR determination, remand the case

13 to the agency, and then wait for Congress to fix

14 the problem. I'm sure some would argue that,

15 well, that could take a long time. What --

16 what's your response to that?

17 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, Your Honor, so

18 Congress, when it addressed the problem, it has

19 already addressed the problem with respect to

20 the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board. In

21 addition, it -- Congress has already held

22 hearings. It has before it ready-made

23 solutions, one historical, more -- one more

24 recent with the TTAB available, and there's only

25 750 of these IPRs currently pending,

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 80-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 79

 1 approximately, which is a little more than three

 2 per IPJ. Congress could readily make it

 3 possible for these to be re-filed if it chose in

 4 a new and constitutional system.

 5 Ultimately, it's more deferential,

 6 it's more respectful of Congress to give

 7 Congress the ultimate authority and give

 8 Congress the choice of what it believes is the

 9 right answer for the structure for an agency

10 responsible for technological innovation and

11 important property rights.

12 This Court shouldn't be placing a

13 thumb on the scale and giving judicial

14 imprimatur to one of multiple diametrically

15 opposed solutions.

16 **JUSTICE GORSUCH:** Thank you.

17 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Justice

18 Kavanaugh.

19 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Thank you, Chief

20 Justice.

21 Good morning, Mr. Lamken. I want to

22 follow up on some other of my colleagues'

23 questions and then turn to severability.

24 First, following up on the Chief's

25 questions, my understanding of your position is

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 81-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 80

 1 that you take the position that ALJs within the

 2 Executive Branch may be somewhat of an uneasy

 3 constitutional solution, but it's historically

 4 settled, we have tenure protection, plus agency

 5 review, and that gives due process but also

 6 gives ultimate agency control of policy. That's

 7 kind of the historically settled solution.

 8 You want to preserve that, correct?

 9 **MR. LAMKEN:** That's exactly right.

10 And it was also that type of solution that

11 persisted for hundreds of years in -- with

12 respect to initial examinations and with -- with

13 respect to interferences as well --

14 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Okay. Here --

15 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- and with respect --

16 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** -- here, the

17 problem is Congress departed from that tradition

18 by keeping the due process part without the

19 agency review part, and you can either keep the

20 review if you want to keep them as inferior

21 officers, or if you want to avoid agency -- any

22 agency review, Congress can do that too, but

23 that, they'd have to do presidential appointment

24 and Senate confirmation of the APJs, correct?

25 **MR. LAMKEN:** That's right. If -- if

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 82-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 81

 1 history means anything, this is an outlier.

 2 It's an aberration and an unconstitutional one

 3 at that.

 4 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Okay. And then

 5 Justice Thomas asked about how it would be

 6 different if delegated, in other words, if the

 7 power of review were granted to the director and

 8 then it's delegated.

 9 Your answer to that, I think, was

10 accountability, is that correct?

11 **MR. LAMKEN:** I think that's right.

12 When a principal officer has authority and then

13 chooses to delegate it to another, assuming that

14 that's consistent with the statute, that

15 principal officer is then accountable for the

16 choice to delegate. If the attorney general

17 says, I am too busy to review these, I want

18 somebody else to do it for me, the public and

19 the President can hold him accountable for that

20 choice.

21 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** And then Justice

22 Breyer asked about inspector generals. He asked

23 about other officers too, but, on inspector

24 generals, my understanding is those are

25 presidential-appointed and Senate-confirmed, and

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 83-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 82

 1 there actually would be a pretty big problem if

 2 they were not -- at least if they had tenure

 3 protection and were not presidential-appointed

 4 and Senate-confirmed.

 5 Do you have any different

 6 understanding of that?

 7 **MR. LAMKEN:** No, I wouldn't.

 8 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Is the Morrison

 9 test still alive after -- for -- Morrison test

10 for Appointments Clause purposes still alive

11 after Edmond?

12 **MR. LAMKEN:** So Morrison relied

13 heavily on the fact that the officer was

14 appointed for a limited duration and for a

15 single task, a single investigation. Whatever

16 one might think of that, it's a completely

17 different matter entirely to have an entire

18 branch of an agency with 200 or more permanent

19 positions that are adjudicating case after case

20 after case without the possibility, without

21 authority and a principal officer to overturn

22 their decisions.

23 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** And in Edmond --

24 **MR. LAMKEN:** And that's in the

25 Executive Branch.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 84-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 83

 1 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** -- just in Edmond

 2 -- just to clarify one thing, I think this comes

 3 from Justice Kagan's questions -- in Edmond,

 4 there was both review of some sort -- she asked

 5 you to pinpoint that -- but review of some sort

 6 but also removability at will, correct?

 7 **MR. LAMKEN:** That's right. They could

 8 be removed from their position and they have --

 9 there was review of some sort. And, here, we

10 have exactly the opposite --

11 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** Let me --

12 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- the absence of review.

13 **JUSTICE KAVANAUGH:** -- let me turn

14 because I -- I've got to turn quickly to

15 severability. So, if we agree with you on the

16 merits, you want to then take down the whole

17 system, and we've frowned upon that repeatedly.

18 And severability, I mean, maybe something of a

19 misnomer in some respects, really follows from

20 the nature of the constitutional problem. We

21 declare what the nature of the constitutional

22 problem is. We say -- then we enter judgment,

23 and then stare decisis means that that

24 constitutional problem exists for all cases.

25 Isn't the nature of the constitutional

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 85-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 84

 1 problem here the lack of director review, which

 2 would mean us saying 6(c) is the constitutional

 3 problem?

 4 **MR. LAMKEN:** No, Your Honor, because

 5 the problem stems also from the fact that the

 6 officers are not appointed by the President and

 7 Senate-confirmed. Either one would be

 8 sufficient to address the problem.

 9 And it's not like separation-of-power

10 cases where the officers just -- the single

11 problem is the officer is not subject to

12 presidential control, and, therefore, all the

13 remedies involve subordinating the official,

14 clipping their wings, so to speak, or striking a

15 novel restriction on removal.

16 Here, the problem is --

17 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you,

18 counsel.

19 Justice Barrett.

20 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Mr. Lamken, I want

21 to pick up where Justice Kavanaugh left off on

22 the remedy here and severability.

23 So, on pages 56 and 57 of your brief,

24 you cite Sorrell and Bowsher and Free

25 Enterprise, and you cite them all for the -- the

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 86-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 85

 1 proposition that if there are multiple ways to

 2 cure a constitutional problem in a statutory

 3 scheme, then the judiciary ought not be

 4 blue-penciling it.

 5 Can you think of any situation in

 6 which we have said, okay, well, there are

 7 multiple flaws in this scheme, but, you know, as

 8 Justice Kavanaugh was just saying, 6(c) seems to

 9 be the big problem, so we're going to think it's

10 the cleanest to go that route? Are -- are you

11 -- can you tell me the negative, that we've

12 never done it?

13 **MR. LAMKEN:** Oh, quite the contrary,

14 Your Honor. In Sorrell, that's exactly what

15 this Court did. It said there was at least five

16 different things that are problematic combined,

17 and it would be a matter of judicial

18 policymaking in order to determine which of

19 those should be removed.

20 This -- it's exactly the same problem

21 here because you have the --

22 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Well, no, no, no,

23 counsel, I -- I understand that we did that in

24 Sorrell, but my question is, have we ever done

25 what we didn't do in Sorrell?

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 87-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 86

 1 **MR. LAMKEN:** Which is to make a --

 2 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Yes --

 3 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- judicial policy

 4 choice?

 5 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** -- to make one that

 6 makes sense. I mean, let's say that Justice

 7 Kavanaugh is right and that it seems very

 8 sensible and makes a lot of sense to solve this

 9 problem, assuming that we say there is one, by

10 saying 6(c) is the problem, so that's -- that's

11 the locus of the constitutional problem here,

12 and we're going to say that that's what we're

13 holding unconstitutional so that going forward,

14 it's just that the PTAB can't have the final

15 word.

16 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, the Court could

17 just as easily say the locus of the

18 constitutional problem is the fact that these

19 officers are not appointed --

20 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** I understand that --

21 **MR. LAMKEN:** -- by the President and

22 Senate-confirmed.

23 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** -- Mr. Lamken, but

24 what I'm asking is, can you cite a case -- or

25 are you telling me that there is none? Can you

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 88-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 87

 1 cite a case for the proposition where we have

 2 done just that? Understanding that that runs

 3 against what you want us to do here, I'm just

 4 asking, is there a negative? Is it the case

 5 that we've always had the position that we had

 6 in Sorrell and we've never said that when there

 7 might be multiple provisions working together

 8 that create a problem or multiple ways of

 9 solving it, that we haven't just chosen one that

10 makes sense?

11 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, I think the -- the

12 -- you're right, Your Honor, in the sense that

13 this Court doesn't make that sort of judicial

14 policy decision when the possibilities are

15 multiple and they point in -- and they point in

16 complete opposite directions.

17 This Court recognizes that it's

18 respectful of Congress to let Congress make the

19 policy choice. And even if this Court could

20 somehow decide that, as a policy matter, it

21 wanted to do one thing or the other -- strike

22 the -- the appointment mechanisms for the ALJs

23 or somehow slice up the statute to try and

24 reinsert the PTO director above the board --

25 it's not a matter of -- of surgical relief then.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 89-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 88

 1 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Okay, Mr. Lamken --

 2 **MR. LAMKEN:** It is --

 3 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** -- let me -- let me

 4 pivot to the Appointments Clause issue.

 5 So Justice Kagan was pointing out

 6 there are many way in which we would say that

 7 APJs are subordinate to the director, and it

 8 seems to me that one way to look at this case is

 9 to say that at a 10,000-foot level, if you look

10 at front-end controls, you know, if you look at

11 hiring and -- and firing and the ability of the

12 director to set policy that the APJs must

13 follow, in many respects, they're inferior

14 officers, and we might say that Congress has

15 given them this one authority, this

16 case-specific review authority, that is one that

17 is inconsistent with the inferior officer role.

18 But it does -- it does seem odd,

19 doesn't it, to say that they are principal

20 officers because they exercise this one piece of

21 authority that seems to go beyond what an

22 inferior officer can do?

23 **MR. LAMKEN:** Well, that, Your Honor,

24 is Freytag. Freytag held that it may well be

25 that a single officer has many responsibilities

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 90-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 89

 1 to those of inferior officers, but if that

 2 officer has authority that goes beyond that for

 3 an inferior officer, if the officer is the final

 4 decision-maker for the Executive Branch where

 5 no -- he has no superior in that context, that

 6 officer is then a principal officer for all

 7 purposes and cannot continue in that office

 8 absent a proper appointment. That is Freytag's

 9 holding.

10 **JUSTICE BARRETT:** Thank you, Mr.

11 Lamken.

12 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** A minute to

13 wrap up, Mr. Lamken.

14 **MR. LAMKEN:** Certainly.

15 For adjudicators to be officers and

16 inferior officers, they have to have a superior

17 who can overrule their decisions before they

18 become the final word of the Executive Branch.

19 Because APJs don't have that superior,

20 they cannot be appointed as inferior officers.

21 The current IPR regime is, as a result,

22 unconstitutional. I know that Mr. Perry pointed

23 to Section 318(b) and the fact that the director

24 does the final action, but Section 318(b) points

25 out that, in fact, the director is made

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 91-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 90

 1 subordinate to the APJs because it says that the

 2 director shall issue and publish the certificate

 3 canceling any claim if the board finds the

 4 patent unpatentable.

 5 Severing APJ removal protections

 6 doesn't solve the problem because they still

 7 have no superior in the exercise of government

 8 authority. But how to fix this problem is a

 9 question for Congress because the possible

10 solutions point in opposite directions.

11 Congress might want them to be Senate-

12 confirmed, as they were -- as examiners-in-chief

13 were for 114 years, or it might want to

14 subordinate them to the director, as Congress

15 ordered for -- as Congress provided for

16 trademark judges last year.

17 Congress can provide an approach by

18 amending the law, but this Court cannot simply

19 rewrite the statute, and it shouldn't allow the

20 Executive Branch to try and jerry-rig a solution

21 through contriving a remedy. The respectful

22 thing here is to let Congress to choose the path

23 forward.

24 The Court should hold the IPR regime

25 unconstitutionally constituted. The IPR

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 92-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 91

 1 proceedings against Arthrex, therefore, cannot

 2 continue and the IPR should be dismissed.

 3 Thank you.

 4 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you,

 5 counsel.

 6 Rebuttal, Mr. Stewart?

 7 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

 8 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES

 9 **MR. STEWART:** Thank you, Mr. Chief

10 Justice.

11 Mr. Lamken referred to this Court's

12 ability to supervise lower courts by reviewing

13 their judgments. But the principal means by

14 which this Court supervises the lower courts is

15 not by affirming or reversing a few dozen lower

16 court judge -- judgments every year.

17 The principal means of supervision is

18 this Court issues precedential opinions that

19 bind lower courts in future cases, and the Court

20 typically tries to exercise its certiorari

21 jurisdiction in such a way that the legal

22 rulings and issues will address questions of law

23 that are both important and recurring.

24 And -- and similarly, in this case,

25 it's important not to ignore the front-end

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 93-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 92

 1 mechanisms that are available to the director to

 2 influence the outcome of board decisions. That

 3 -- that's so both because they are the most

 4 practically efficacious means of using the

 5 director's resources and because these are the

 6 means that are most often characteristic of the

 7 exercise of supervisory power.

 8 But, second, Mr. Lamken said that the

 9 director can't be held accountable if the board

10 issues a decision that people believe are wrong

11 -- is wrong, and that -- that's incorrect. The

12 losing party in an IPR can always ask the

13 director to convene a new panel to grant

14 rehearing and to put the director himself on

15 that panel, and if the director declines to take

16 that step, he can be held accountable for

17 allowing the panel decision to remain in place.

18 That -- the only imperfection in the

19 director's accountability and review authority

20 is that the director could be outvoted by the

21 other two members of the panel that he convenes,

22 but those other two members of the panel would

23 be bound by any directives of law that the

24 director had issued.

25 The only practical fear is that those

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 94-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 93

 1 two people will disagree with the director's

 2 view of the facts, and to that extent,

 3 accountability is limited.

 4 But, as Justice Kagan's questions

 5 pointed out, that's exactly what was going on in

 6 Edmond, that in Edmond, people who thought that

 7 the facts had been determined incorrectly could

 8 only blame the Coast Guard Criminal -- Court of

 9 Criminal Appeals judges. They couldn't blame

10 any Senate-confirmed officer.

11 The -- the last thing I'd say is Mr.

12 Perry referred to AUSAs and people in positions

13 like that. They'll -- they'll go into court

14 conducting trials. They'll have to make snap

15 decisions about whether to object to particular

16 evidence, how to respond if the judge

17 disapproves their proposed line of questioning.

18 As -- as a practical matter, these are

19 decisions that often can't be undone after the

20 fact, and so a blanket rule that an officer is a

21 principal officer if he or she can do anything

22 that binds the United States without being

23 subject to -- to being countermanded by a

24 Senate-confirmed officer, that would be

25 unworkable.

 Heritage Reporting Corporation

----------------------- Page 95-----------------------

 Official - Subject to Final Review

 94

 1 Mr. Lamken attempts to confine the

 2 rule he is advocating to adjudicative officials,

 3 but there's really no principled basis for

 4 striking that limitation. Edmond makes clear

 5 that administrative adjudicators are subject to

 6 the same Appointments Clause principles as other

 7 federal officers.

 8 Thank you.

 9 **CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:** Thank you,

10 counsel. The case is submitted.

11 (Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the case

12 was submitted.)

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

 Heritage Reporting Corporation